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Abstract. We present an assessment method to analyze whether the disruption in 
supply of a group of materials endangers the transition to low-carbon infrastructure. 
We define criticality as the combination of the potential for supply disruption and the 
exposure of the system of interest to that disruption. Low-carbon energy depends on 
multiple technologies comprised of a multitude of materials of varying criticality. Our 
methodology allows us to assess the simultaneous potential for supply disruption of a 
range of materials. Generating a specific target level of low-carbon energy implies a 
dynamic roll-out of technology at a specific scale. Our approach is correspondingly 
dynamic, and monitors the change in criticality during the transition towards a low-
carbon energy goal. It is thus not limited to the quantification of criticality of a 
particular material at a particular point in time. We apply our method to criticality in 
the proposed UK energy transition as a demonstration, with a focus on neodymium 
use in electric vehicles. Although we anticipate that the supply disruption of 
neodymium will decrease, our results show the criticality of low carbon energy 
generation increases, as a result of increasing exposure to neodymium-reliant 
technologies. We present a number of potential responses to reduce the criticality 
through a reduction in supply disruption potential of the exposure of the UK to that 
disruption. 
1 Introduction 
Emissions reductions of the scale required to meet the challenging targets set 
by international and national bodies (HM Government 2008; UNFCCC 2008) 
will require rapid, systemic change including extensive refurbishment and 
replacement of infrastructure systems and unprecedented roll out of low 
carbon technologies. Many technologies required to make this systemic 
change exist today, but often rely on critical materials and components at risk 
of supply disruption and which are difficult to substitute (US Department of 
Energy 2011). It has been recognized that the deployment of low carbon 
technologies is potentially susceptible to disruption in the supply of critical 
metals and could thus constrain and derail decarbonisation efforts (Moss et al. 
2011). However, the degree of criticality and its potential effect on the roll-out 
of new low-carbon technology have only been so far described in preliminary, 
qualitative terms (International Energy Association - Renewable Energy 
Technology Deployment 2012).  
Previous research has identified factors that contribute to material criticality, 
as well as the groups of materials that might be considered to be critical to 
specific low carbon technologies (for example (European Commission 2010; 
T E Graedel et al. 2012; Moss et al. 2011)). The majority consider criticality 
to be a combination of the potential for disruption of the supply of these 
materials and the vulnerability of the system of interest to that potential for 
disruption (which includes an assessment of the exposure to disruption and 
the ability of the system to respond to exposure. For example, Graedel et al (T 
E Graedel et al. 2012) consider vulnerability to be a combination of the 
importance of the material of interest and the ability of the system to respond 
to disruption. The European Commission (European Commission 2010) uses 
a more specific conceptualization in its definition of critical materials, which 
was the contribution of the sector using the material of interest (in terms of 
Gross Value Added). 
Less work has been done to determine the risk of criticality to entire 
infrastructure systems (and by consequence the economies that rely thereon) 
posed by these critical materials and components, or to analyse how this 
vulnerability might change over time. This paper is concerned with the 
assessment of the risk  associated with constraints from critical materials 
supply that is introduced as a result of the extensive refurbishment and 
replacement of both current infrastructure systems, and the unprecedented roll 
out of low carbon energy technologies.  
2 Assessing Material Criticality  
The scope and purpose of the assessment method used in this paper differs 
substantially from that of previous assessments, which attempt to quantify the 
criticality of a material in a particular geographic or business context. Instead, 
we use a method that assesses whether the disruption in supply of a group of 
materials could impede strategic infrastructure transitions.  
This has three implications for the approach used to assessing material 
criticality: it requires us to assess the combined potential for constraint posed 
by a range of material required for low carbon technologies (i.e. many 
materials for one use rather than one material for many uses); it requires us to 
assess the change in constraints on a particular goal during the transition 
towards that goal, rather than the quantification of criticality of a particular 
material at a particular point in time; and it requires us to recognise that the 
effects of any disruption are specifically concerned with ability to achieve a 
particular goal. The methodology is described in full in an associated paper 
(Roelich et al 2013) but is summarised below. 
We use a stocks and flows model to forecast demand for potentially critical 
materials from a pre-defined scenario of infrastructure roll-out. The 
assessment of risk of constraints from critical materials determines whether 
disruptions in the supply of these critical materials could constrain this 
infrastructure roll-out and whether this constraint could prevent achievement 
of the overall goal. Our assessment of the risk of material constraints contains 
two principal indices: 
 Supply disruption potential, which quantifies the likelihood that the 
production of a material, or group of materials, will be disrupted. 
 Exposure to disruption, which quantifies the effect of disruption on 
the goal in question. 
When combined (i.e. multiplied), the two indices provide an assessment of the 
risk that material criticality poses to low carbon energy system transition. 
Importantly, both indices are produced as a forecasted time-series, supporting 
dynamic analysis of material constraints. When combined, the two indices 
provide an assessment of the risk that material criticality poses to low carbon 
transition. 
The methodology used to quantify these indices is summarized in Figure 1 
and described below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Components of metric for assessing the criticality of infrastructure 
transitions 
2.1 Supply Disruption Potential 
The supply disruption potential index represents the likelihood that access to a 
particular material could be restricted as a result of an imbalance between 
production and requirements, geo-politics or environmental constraints. This 
part of the assessment is specific to a particular material but only considers 
disruption at the point of production.  
2.1.1 Production:requirements imbalance 
The potential for there to be a future imbalance between the mining 
production of a particular material and the future requirements for that 
material from all economic sectors is measured using a ratio of requirements 
to production over the period under investigation. The EC study uses a 
version of this ratio with a static level of production and only taking into 
account requirements from new technologies (European Commission 2010). 
This ratio has been adapted in this study to include a forecast of production, 
which has been created by projecting historic trends of production increase 
and combined with a forecast in requirements from all uses, not just new 
technologies. An imbalance between potential production and forecasted 
requirements implies that there is potential for disruption of supply. 
There are a number of factors that could exacerbate the 
requirements:production imbalance by potentially constraining increases in 
production. Three are considered to be of primary importance in this study: 
many of these materials are not produced as primary products but as co-
products of other materials; the environmental sensitivity of land surrounding 
mines may give rise to restrictive legislation; and geographic monopolies in 
production may tempt policymakers to impose supply restrictions for 
geopolitical purposes. These moderators of production are discussed in turn 
below. 
2.1.2 Companion fraction 
A large proportion of materials currently considered critical are not mined in 
their own right, but rather as a co-product of a primary material, usually a 
‘major’ metal with very high demand across a range of economic sectors, 
such as copper or zinc (Ayres and Peiró 2013). If a critical metal constitutes 
only a small proportion (in terms of tonnage and/or price) of the output of a 
mine, it is unlikely that production would increase solely as a result of a rise 
in demand for this material, since this would result in a surplus (and thus price 
suppression) of the primary metal, potentially making the mine less economic 
overall. The companion fraction metric is a combination of the mass fraction 
of critical materials in the output of mines
1
 and the price fraction, which is the 
percentage contribution of the material to the price of one unit of mine 
output
2
. It is possible that the companion fraction of critical materials will 
                                                     
1
 This is taken as an average of the output of all mines producing the material of 
interest and is calculated using data from USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (US 
Geological Survey 2010). 
2
 This is taken to be the price per unit of material (using 2010 figures taken from 
USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (US Geological Survey 2010)) multiplied by 
the mass of that material, divided by the total monetary output of the mine. 
change over time; however, there is insufficient data to forecast how this 
might develop. Therefore it is assumed that the companion fraction stays the 
same over the period of analysis. 
2.1.3 Access 
Mineral deposits, by virtue of the processes by which they are formed, tend to 
be concentrated in a specific geographic location. This geographic 
concentration of materials does not directly constrain the acceleration of 
production; however, the monopoly created by this concentration of 
production can restrict access to produced materials, further distorting the 
balance between requirements (outside the country of production) and 
available production. There is potential for producing countries to pursue 
industrial and/or geopolitical strategies to reserve resources for their exclusive 
use though trade restrictions, taxations and investment policies. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to quantify the level of 
concentration of worldwide production and represents the potential for 
disruption of material supply for geopolitical reasons (European Commission 
2010; T E Graedel et al. 2012). Increases in the HHI indicate a decrease in 
competition and an increase in market power of the producing country(ies). 
The geographic concentration of production at present is not necessarily 
indicative of concentration in the future. For example, China currently 
produces over 97 per cent of rare earth elements; however, it only holds 36 
per cent of reported reserves (US Geological Survey 2010). This would imply 
that geopolitics could potentially become a less significant factor in the 
potential for supply disruption. To take this into account, we forecast the 
distribution of production of each critical material and estimate how the HHI 
might change over time. The forecast is produced by interpolating between 
the distribution of current production and the distribution of current reserves. 
This assumes that production distribution at the end of the period (2050) is the 
same as the reserve distribution in 2011. This is a simplification of the real 
situation but is used to indicate how the HHI might evolve over time based on 
current reserves. 
2.1.4 Environmental Constraints 
The production of metals can have significant environmental impacts as a 
result of pollutant discharge to air land and water and waste production 
(Moriguchi 2010). In addition to these impacts, production processes consume 
a great deal of energy and water, which will increase and ore grades 
deteriorate (Norgate 2010). In an attempt to contain these impacts, and as a 
result of international treaties, environmental regulation is becoming 
increasingly stringent. This is presenting a barrier to expansion of existing 
operations or the development of new reserves by increasing the cost of 
production.  
The Environmental Performance Index is used as a measure of “the risk that 
measures might be taken by countries with the intention of protecting the 
environment and by doing so endangering the supply of raw materials…” 
(European Commission 2010). The EPI provides a country level comparison 
of the extent of environmental policies and indicates the relative effectiveness 
of countries at managing a range of environmental pressures  (Emerson et al. 
2012). The majority of critical metals are mined in more than one country, 
therefore, it is necessary to combine the EPI of individual countries to 
determine what the European Commission terms the Environmental Country 
Risk (ECR). The EPI for each country producing the material of interest is 
weighted using the proportion of production arising in that country and 
combined to give the total ECR for the material of interest. 
The EPI for each country is held static over the period of analysis because 
there is insufficient historical data on which to base any forecasts about the 
rate of this improvement. However, the proportions of production is different 
countries (and therefore the contribution of each EPI to ECR) is likely to 
change. The split of global production between countries is obtained from the 
HHI forecasts which assume that the distribution of production in 2050 will 
match the distribution of reserves in 2011. 
2.1.5 Combining indices 
Various approaches have been taken to combination of metrics in the 
literature (Erdmann and Thomas E Graedel 2011). Here, we take a 
mathematically robust approach to derive a ‘first approximation’ expression. 
For a given material, we assume that the exacerbating factors tempering the 
production:requirement imbalance  (namely companion fraction, access and 
environmental country risk) are independent and thus additive. The sum of 
these metrics are then multiplied by the production:requirement imbalance  to 
represent their tempering effect. We normalise criticality with respect to a 
well-characterised element (iron) to allow us to express relative criticality. 
2.2 Exposure to supply disruption 
The exposure to disruption index has been created to assess the effects of 
supply chain disruption on the realisation of a particular goal, in this case the 
transition to a low carbon infrastructure. It includes the sensitivity of the goal 
to a particular technology with material constraints and the sensitivity of the 
goal to rises in material prices (which is one of the principal economic effects 
of perceived scarcity and supply chain disruption). 
2.2.1 Goal sensitivity 
The overall goal of transition to a low carbon energy system is operationalized 
as scenarios of technology roll out required to achieve decarbonisation. In this 
project we use DECC’s 2050 pathways, which aim to achieve an 80% 
reduction in UK carbon emissions by 2050 (DECC 2011). Some of the 
technologies in these scenarios contain materials at risk of supply disruption, 
which could in turn disrupt the required roll out of those technologies. The 
goal sensitivity, or the impact of a supply disruption on the overall goal, is 
measured in this metric as the proportion of the decarbonisation scenario that 
relies on the technology or technologies affected by the potential material 
supply disruption. A high value of goal sensitivity (i.e. approaching unity) 
would imply that constraining the roll out of the technology of interest could 
completely derail the goal of low carbon infrastructure. A low value of goal 
sensitivity (i.e. approaching zero) would mean that the goal was relatively 
insensitive to the roll out of the technology of interest. 
2.2.2 Price sensitivity 
As well as having the potential to physically constrain technology roll out; 
supply disruption could cause an increase in price, which could create further 
constraints. To capture this effect, the price sensitivity metric quantifies the 
proportion of the total technology cost contributed by the cost of the material 
at risk of supply disruption. A high value of price sensitivity (i.e. approaching 
unity) would imply that the technology cost was very sensitive to fluctuations 
in material price. A low value of price sensitivity (i.e. approaching zero) 
would imply that the technology cost was relatively insensitive to price 
fluctuations and material supply disruption was less likely to constrain the 
required technology roll out. 
2.2.3 Combining exposure metrics 
The two indices are multiplied to reflect their cumulative effect on exposure. 
At this stage they are unweighted, because there is no clear evidence to justify 
that one factor is more important than the other. 
3 Application of methodology – the case of low carbon private 
vehicles in the UK 
The criticality assessment method is demonstrated using a case study of the 
risk of neodymium criticality to low carbon private vehicles in the UK. We 
recognize that this is only a first approximation as we need to take into 
account the fact that almost all significant technologies are exposed to 
criticality via multiple elements and that multiple technologies contain each 
element. The method we describe in this article allows us to assess the 
combined potential for supply disruption of a range of materials required for 
low carbon energy generation, however only one material and technology are 
assessed here for simplicity.  
Rare earth elements, predominantly neodymium, are used in permanent 
magnets required for motors in electric, and hybrid electric vehicles. Electric 
and hybrid electric vehicles are central to many of DECC’s 2050 Pathways 
(DECC 2011).  Neodymium is already identified by many recent reports as 
being at risk of supply disruption as a result of the concentration of its 
production in China (European Commission 2010; Moss et al. 2011; US 
Department of Energy 2011). We use this case study to determine how this 
potential supply disruption might affect the deployment of low carbon 
personal transport in the UK. 
3.1 Neodymium Supply Disruption Potential Case Study: low carbon 
private vehicles  
Permanent magnets used in electric motors contain both neodymium and 
dysprosium but the quantity of neodymium far outweighs that of dysprosium 
and the supply disruption potential of both materials is of the same order; so, 
for simplicity, we show only the supply disruption potential of neodymium. 
When we forecast neodymium production and requirements we find that the 
production: requirements imbalance over the period 2012-2050 is 0.33 
compared to 0.0007 for iron, indicating that there is a high potential for 
supply disruption.  
Neodymium is mined as a co-product of other rare earth metals and represents 
only 15% of rare earth mine output. It also has a relatively low contribution to 
the economic value of mine output (16%) so could be expected to have 
limited influence over total mine production when compared to other rare 
earth elements. This results in a high score for the companion fraction metric 
(0.85), which indicates that co-mining has a high potential to exacerbate the 
production:requirements imbalance. 
 The current production of neodymium is almost a monopoly, with the 
majority produced in China; therefore HHI is almost unity in 2012 (0.92). 
However, neodymium reserves are less geographically concentrated that 
current production would suggest (US Geological Survey 2010). When 
production distribution is forecast towards reserve distribution (as described 
above) the HHI reduces to 0.28 by 2050. This reflects the likely future 
evolution of a far more competitive supply chain, which could mitigate the 
high disruption potential. 
The risk that environmental legislation could constrain the development of 
new reserves of neodymium, is relatively low in 2012 (0.42) as a result of the 
dominance of China (which has a low EPI) in its production. However, as we 
increase the distribution of production, the contribution of countries with a 
higher level of environmental legislation, such as Australia and the US, 
increases and the ECR increases slightly by 2050 to reflect this increase in 
constraint from regulation (to 0.47). This increase could exacerbate the 
production:requirements imbalance by constraining the  expansion of 
production but it is unlikely to be significant given the scale of the increase.  
The evolution of Access (HHI) and ECR for neodymium are shown in Figure 
2 below. Note that companion fraction and production:requirements 





Figure 2: Neodymium Supply Disruption potential 2012-2050 (a) Access (b) 
Environmental Country Risk (c) combined indices and (d) supply disruption 
potential. 
When combined, the metrics show that the supply disruption potential of 
neodymium is reducing over the period of analysis from 10.86 to 7.90, a 27% 
reduction.  
3.2 Exposure of low carbon private vehicles to neodymium supply 
disruption 
The ‘goal’ of low carbon private vehicles, which is exposed to supply 
disruption is taken to be the total number of cars added to stock each year 
(which is the total number required each year less the number scrapped in that 
year). This has been derived for both DECC’s Core Pathway and its 
a b 
c d 
Renewable Pathway (DECC 2011) for the period from 2012 to 2050. The 
number of electric and hybrid electric vehicles (which contain neodymium) is 
also taken from the DECC scenarios. 
The price sensitivity of the goal was estimated using a typical electric vehicle, 
which is representative of the type of vehicle that would be deployed in the 
initial period of the study. It is recognised that the design of technologies will 
change over time, affecting the price sensitivity. However, this change cannot 
be quantified to any degree of certainty at this time, therefore, this metric is 





Table 1: Cost data used to calculate price sensitivity 
 
 Cost Source 
Cost of material £25.78 0.62kg/vehicle (U.S Department of 
Energy 2010) high estimate. £41.48/kg 
(US Geological Survey 
2010)(converted from USD using 
0.66£/USD) 
Cost of technology £28,490 www.whatcar.com mid range model 
Nissan Leaf 
 
When combined with goal sensitivity, this gives us the exposure of private 
vehicles to neodymium supply disruption from 2012 to 2050, shown in Figure 
3. The trend is the opposite to that of the supply disruption potential, with 
exposure increasing dramatically over the period under investigation, electric 
and hybrid electric come to dominate the private vehicle sector. The 
significant trough between 2030 and 2040 in the exposure trend is an artefact 
of the assumptions relating to the scrapping and replacement of vehicles made 
in the DECC scenarios. The calculations in this paper use additions to stock to 
calculate exposure. This means that when a vehicle comes to the end of its life 
it must be replaced if the desired stock is to remain the same. Between 2030 
and 2040 the number of electric vehicles added is low, as a result of a long 
vehicle lifetime and a low increase in stock requirements. In contract, during 
this period, the majority of internal combustion engine (ICE) cars must be 
replaced in order to keep stock levels constant (because the stock present has 
come to the end of its life). Therefore, the ratio of vehicle containing PMGs 
(electric and hybrid) to those without (ICE) is artificially low, resulting in a 
reduced index of exposure.  
 
 
Figure 3: Low carbon private vehicle exposure to neodymium supply disruption 
3.3 Criticality of low carbon private vehicles in the UK 
The decreasing potential for supply disruption of neodymium mitigates the 
risk of criticality of low carbon private vehicles, to some extent, but when the 
indicators of supply disruption potential and exposure are combined, they 
show an increasing trend for criticality as a result of the increasing reliance on 
electric and hybrid electric vehicles. Criticality increases to a maximum of 
8.5×10
-3
, an increase of nearly 330%. This trend is similarly dramatic in the 
renewables scenario. However, toward the latter half of the study the 
criticality is mitigated by the decreasing supply disruption potential resulting 
from the anticipated broader distribution of neodymium production. 
 
 
Figure 4: Criticality of low carbon private vehicles in the UK 
4 The challenges presented by criticality 
The results of the case study demonstrate the importance of considering both 
the potential for disruption of a particular material and the exposure of the 
system to that material when assessing the risk of material criticality. In the 
case of low carbon energy generation, the likely decrease in supply disruption 
potential for the key critical material slightly mitigates the increase in the 
exposure of the goal to that material as the UK becomes almost entirely 
dependent on electric vehicles. However, the dynamic aspect of criticality 
appears to be dominated by our exposure to disruption, and decreasing 
technology diversity, indicating that our response to criticality should focus 
here.  
The case study also shows the importance of considering the nature of the 
change in criticality over time – the results showed a steep increase in 
criticality after between 2020 to 2025, when roll out of electric and hybrid 
vehicles is projected to increase dramatically. It will be more difficult to 
devise industrial policy responses to such steep changes than to static high 
levels of criticality.  
The implication of this steep increase is that the supply chain supporting low 
carbon vehicles will be unable to respond to the increasing demand for new 
vehicles and we will not see the reductions in ICE required to meet carbon 
emission reduction targets. Another significant implication is the effect that 
this supply disruption could have on the UK economy; we have a burgeoning 
electric vehicle manufacturing industry in the UK, which could be severely 
constrained by supply disruptions and the potential associated shift back to 
ICE vehicles. 
We have not included any discussion of a threshold of criticality because our 
indicators are intended to be used to compare the relative criticality of 
different pathways to a decarbonized energy system, rather than defining the 
point at which the risk of criticality becomes unacceptable. This is not to say 
that it is not possible to define a threshold of this nature rather that it is not the 
intention of this article; criticality thresholds will need to be informed by a 
combination of political and economic factors as well as a technical analysis 
of criticality. 
5 Potential responses to criticality 
The methodology described above aims to not only quantify the criticality of 
infrastructure transitions but also to support analysis of how this criticality 
could be reduced. The methodology is purposefully transparent to support 
analysis of the causes of criticality and to allow responses to be targeted at the 
most important causes. We discuss below the potential responses to criticality 
of low carbon private vehicles in the UK, grouped by the index to which they 
would contribute. 
5.1 Supply disruption potential 
The principal points of intervention to reduce the supply disruption potential 
of neodymium are to reduce the production:requirements imbalance and to 
encourage the diversification of the production of neodymium. The UK has 
greater potential to address the former through its contribution to reducing the 
global requirements for neodymium. It has three approaches to doing this: 
reducing total consumption of neodymium through consuming less to deliver 
the same output, using less resource per unit of consumption and recovering 
secondary neodymium to displace requirements for primary material. The 
former response would also reduce the UKs exposure to supply disruption 
potential so would have a greater cumulative effect on criticality. 
Within the context of this case study, there is little potential to reduce the 
quantity of neodymium within each vehicle, without substantial technology 
change. The magnetic strength of the most recent generation of neodymium 
magnets is believed to be close to fundamental and technical limits of this 
material (Kara et al. 2010).  
Increasing recovery of neodymium also prevent challenges; despite a 
significant amount of research into recycling technologies there is no 
commercially developed processes due to drawbacks on yields and cost (Kara 
et al. 2010). There is an increasing focus on collection and separation of end-
of-life vehicles and electronics, as a result of recent EU legislation (Official 
Journal of the European Communities 2000; Official Journal of the European 
Communities 2012), however, there are currently no treatment facilities in the 
UK. There is potential that facilities could be developed, which would not 
only reduce supply disruption potential but could also retain neodymium in 
the UK, contributing to both security and the economy. 
5.1.1 Exposure 
In addition to reducing exposure through reducing the total number of 
vehicles required to deliver the same service to the UK economy, diversifying 
the technology contributing to low carbon vehicles could further reduce our 
goal exposure. Electric motors which require permanent magnets are favoured 
in the UK, therefore; technology diversity would require a move away from 
electric vehicles to hydrogen or other fuel cell vehicles. This would have 
significant implications of the UK; 
 It would increase uncertainty over the required capacity of the 
electric vehicle charging infrastructure, which goes hand in hand with 
dominance of this technology. This could serve to increase the unit 
cost of this infrastructure and to delay its roll out, which is already 
constraining electric vehicle uptake; and 
 It could reduce the contribution of the burgeoning electric vehicle 
manufacturing sector to the UK economy. 
Price sensitivity could be reduced by either reducing the amount of material 
used per unit (as discussed above) or by substituting neodymium for another, 
cheaper material. The only appropriate replacements for neodymium are 
dysprosium or praseodymium, both of which are more expensive than 
neodymium (Kara et al. 2010). Samarium-cobalt magnets have similar 
performance at high temperatures to neodymium but have only half the 
magnetic strength, making them less suitable for use in electric vehicle 
motors. Substitution at a material level is unlikely to be appropriate for 
permanent magnets. 
6 Conclusions 
The approach to analysis of risks of constraints from critical materials 
developed in this article, integrated with the stocks and flows modelling, 
represents initial steps towards developing a systematic framework for 
analysing the future material constraints on infrastructure transitions. It is 
hoped that such a framework will ultimately become a key ecological 
economics tool, implemented in infrastructure planning processes. 
This article presents an assessment method to analyze whether disruption in 
the supply chain of a group of materials could impede strategic infrastructure 
transitions. We conceptualize this as criticality, which is a combination of the 
potential for supply disruption and the exposure of the system of interest to 
disruption that enables us to; consider the potential for disruption of multiple 
materials; assess the effects of disruption on the installation of physical 
infrastructure; and assess the change in constraints on a particular goal during 
the transition towards that goal, rather than the quantification of criticality of a 
particular material at a particular point in time. 
We found that it is important to consider both aspects of criticality; the 
potential for supply disruption and the exposure of the goal to that disruption. 
This is exemplified in our case study of the criticality of neodymium for low 
carbon private vehicles where the likely decrease in supply disruption 
potential for the key critical material slightly mitigates the increase in the 
exposure of the goal to that material as the UK becomes almost entirely 
dependent on electric vehicles. However, the dynamic aspect of criticality 
appears to be dominated by our exposure to disruption, and decreasing 
technology diversity, indicating that our response to criticality should focus 
here.   
It is not just the overall trend that is of concern in this case study, but the steep 
increases in criticality over short periods of time. These step changes in 
criticality are more challenging for industry and policy makers to respond to 
than static, high levels of criticality. This shows the value of a more dynamic, 
infrastructure-focused analysis of criticality, which can potentially be useful 
in providing policy makers with information to reduce the probability of 
‘locking-in’ to currently attractive but potentially future-critical technologies. 
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